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Abstract 
 This paper examines the suitability of the proposed monetary union among the members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). To do so, we identify the underlying structural shocks 
that these economies are subject to and assess the extent to which the shocks are symmetric. 
Additionally, we test for common trends and common business cycles among the GCC 
economies. We find that while the transitory demand shocks are typically symmetric, the 
permanent supply shocks are asymmetric. Furthermore, we do not find synchronous long-run and 
short-run movements in output. Despite the progress that has been made in terms of integration, 
our findings indicate that the conditions for forming a GCC monetary union have not as yet been 
met. 
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1. Introduction 
In May 1981, six Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) 
signed the charter of the GCC. Among various objectives, these states sought “to coordinate their 
financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies 
and central banks, including the endeavor to establish a joint currency.” Progress has been made 
towards the implementation of these goals, and many measures have been taken to align their 
monetary, financial and economic systems as a prelude for a common currency to be introduced 
no later than January 2010. All the GCC members have already pegged their currencies to the US 
dollar. Furthermore, a customs union was established in 2003, and plans were set for the 
formation of a common market in which all barriers on the movements of goods, services, labor 
and capital are to be abolished by 2007. In 2005, the GCC members adopted the EU convergence 
criteria with respect to budget deficit, public debt, currency reserves, interest rate, and inflation. 
Fulfillment of most of the convergence criteria has been achieved, with inflation being the lone 
exception. Despite these impressive advances, many economists and analysts argue that the 
progress has been remarkably slow and additional steps are required for the monetary union to be 
effective (Dar and Humayon, 2001 and Darrat and Al-Shams, 2005 among others).  
The feasibility of a potential monetary union for a block of countries is usually evaluated 
by weighing the benefits and costs of joining a currency union (Mundell, 1961 and McKinnon, 
1963). Using a single currency leads to the elimination of transaction costs and uncertainties 
(monitoring exchange rates and predicting their fluctuations, costs of currency conversion, and 
keeping and managing reserves for intra-regional trade). On the other hand, participating in a 
monetary union involves losing autonomy over monetary instruments such as interest rates and 
exchange rates that serve as stabilizers. It has been argued that countries that are highly integrated 
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in terms of trade and factor mobility, that share harmonized business cycles, and subject to 
similar exogenous shocks are more likely to be suitable candidates for a monetary union.      
This study investigates the extent to which the member states of the GCC meet the 
theoretical criteria for an optimal monetary union. Most previous studies have examined the 
feasibility of a currency union based on the observed similarities of the economies and the 
degrees of monetary and fiscal convergence that have been achieved. We contribute to these 
efforts by exploring the symmetry of the external shocks that the economies are subject to and the 
degree of synchronization in long-run economic activity and in short-run business cycles. To do 
this, we apply Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) procedure for identifying demand and supply 
disturbances across member states. Based on the aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-AS) 
framework, we assume that demand shocks lead to temporary changes in output and permanent 
changes in prices, whereas supply shocks, such as those originating from changes in technology, 
result in permanent changes in both output and prices. For the purpose of identification, we 
impose the  restriction that demand shocks have no long-run effect on output. Once the 
exogenous demand and supply shocks are recovered, we compute the correlations of the shocks 
across countries. If the underlying disturbances are symmetrically distributed across countries 
this means that the costs of a common currency are relatively small and the desirability of a 
monetary union is high. The procedure has been applied to several actual and potential currency 
unions (for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994, Arnon and Spivak, 1996, Horvath and 
Ratfai, 2004, and Buigut and Valev, 2005), but has not been applied for the GCC region. 
Since the degree of correlation between shocks does not accurately resemble short-run 
output co-movements, we complement our analysis by both testing for cointegration (to assess 
the existence of long-run movements in real output among countries) and for the existence of 
common short-run cycles as suggested by Vahid and Engle (1993). For a currency union to be 
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viable it is essential to have both long-run synchronous real output co-movements and short-run 
common business cycles. To the best of our knowledge, a similar analysis has not been 
conducted for the GCC.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed survey of the previous 
empirical studies that dealt with the GCC region and outline their shortcomings. Our 
methodologies and data sources are presented in section 3. In section 4, we present the results of 
our tests of synchronization of shocks, long-run trends and short-run business cycles. A summary 
and some concluding remarks are provided in section 5.   
2. Previous Empirical Evidence 
Most of the earlier studies tackling how ready the GCC region is to establish a common 
currency referred to the costs of forming a union based on several economic, social and political 
characteristics of the economies. Overall, the vast majority of studies concluded that the region is 
not ready to abolish their national currencies and adopt a common currency.  
 An early attempt to examine the readiness of the GCC to form a currency union was made 
by Zaidi (1990). He observed convergence in inflation rates and moderate dispersion in the 
growth rates of broad money. Furthermore, he found that the responsiveness of output to 
unanticipated money growth, and thus the inflation-unemployment tradeoffs, vary greatly among 
GCC members. To avoid serious consequences of the observed variations, Zaidi (1990) 
suggested extensive coordination of monetary policies. 
In an informal assessment of the potential of a GCC monetary union, Dar and Presley 
(2001) pointed out the low level of integration among GCC members as illustrated by the 
insignificant volume of intra-regional trade. They attributed this fact to the similarity of  oil-based  
economic structures and to economic and political factors. The authors recommended introducing 
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more flexible rules for intra-regional trade and FDI, enhancing the production diversification 
process, accelerating privatization efforts, and increasing Saudi Arabia's trade with GCC 
members instead of trading outside the region.  
A detailed examination of the progress in integration efforts of GCC members is provided 
by Laabas and Limam (2002). They conducted a formal test based on the generalized purchasing 
power parity and found the exchange rates to be closely related and to share the same stochastic 
trend. By examining various eligibility criteria for currency union including openness, factor 
mobility, commodity diversification, production structure, price and wage flexibility, similarity 
of inflation rates, degree of policy integration, and political factors, they concluded that not all 
the prior conditions are favorable for a currency union. In particular, they referred to a lack of 
production diversification, limited intra-regional trade, slow convergence in macroeconomic 
fundamentals, and unsynchronized business cycles. On the other hand, the authors maintained 
that the failure to meet the prior conditions does not necessarily mean that the region is not ready 
for the formation of a monetary union. As in the case of the European Union, the eligibility 
criteria are generally fulfilled ex-post rather than ex-ante. Launching a currency union could 
result in the alignment of business cycles and an increase in the volume of intra-regional trade. 
To boost the odds for a successful union, the authors called for the elimination of restrictions on 
free movement of goods and production factors and to a larger degree of political integration.  
A similar examination of the readiness of GCC countries for a common currency was 
carried out by Jadresic (2002). He weighed the possible benefits and costs incurred as a result of 
replacing individual GCC currencies with a common regional currency and concluded that the 
success of such a union is conditional on a broader set of measures including the removal of 
domestic and cross-border distortions that hamper trade and foreign investments, coordinating 
policies that ensure macroeconomic stability, and enhancing the process of political integration. 
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Fasano and Schaechter (2003) had an overall favorable view of the GCC monetary union. 
They asserted that such a union when combined with the appropriate macroeconomic and 
structural policies can improve efficiency of financial services, lower transactions costs, increase 
transparency in prices of goods and services, facilitate proper investment decisions, and promote 
the allocation of resources within the region. 
Unlike most of the previous studies, Darrat and Al-Shamsi (2005) concluded that the 
failure of the GCC members to achieve full economic and financial integration is not the outcome 
of economic and financial incompatibility among the region's countries but more likely the 
product of sociopolitical differences that may have hindered the progress towards a viable 
common block. The authors reached these conclusions by testing for cointegration among the 
GCC countries’ GDP, inflation, exchange rate, money stock and monetary base. They found that 
the Gulf countries share a common long-run trend linking their economic activity, financial 
markets, and monetary policies. The existence of cointegration does not, however, imply that the 
short-run business cycles are synchronized. Both synchronous long-run real output trends and 
short-run common business cycles are essential for the formation of a successful currency union. 
Sturm and Siegfried (2005) carried out a comprehensive study in which they evaluated 
the progress that the Gulf countries have made in their quest for a common currency. As in earlier 
studies, their results showed a remarkable monetary and structural convergence but a sluggish 
fiscal convergence. For the proposed monetary union to be credible and sustainable, they called 
upon GCC members to establish a supranational monetary institution that will be responsible for 
the design of monetary and exchange rate policies geared to the conditions of the region as whole 
rather than coordinating national policies. 
A recent study by Hebous (2006) highlighted the significant progress that the GCC 
countries have made in terms of convergence if the European convergence criteria is taken as a 
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reference. He emphasized the similarities among the GCC countries as the main factor leading to 
reduced costs of forming a currency union.    
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Structural VAR 
In order to understand the theoretical foundations for the restrictions needed to identify 
the underlying structural shocks we use the familiar aggregate demand (AD), short-run aggregate 
supply (SRAS) and long-run aggregate supply (LRAS) system. A positive demand disturbance 
(Figure 1) causes AD to shift from AD to AD1 thus reaching a new short-run equilibrium at E1 in 
which both the output (y) and price level (p) increase. Pressures in the labor market result in 
rising wages that in the long-run lead to a new equilibrium along the LRAS at (E2). Thus, the 
impact of a permanent demand shock is a temporary rise in output in the short-run followed by 
convergence to the initial output level, but with a permanent impact on price levels. 
On the other hand, a positive supply shock (Figure 2) causes both SRAS and LRAS to 
shift to the right. In the short run a new equilibrium at (E1) in which p falls and y rises is reached. 
Eventually, we move to a new long-run equilibrium at (E2) in which p continues to fall and y to 
rise. Thus, the impact of a supply shock is permanent on both output and prices.   
 In order to identify the underlying shocks we apply the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
SVAR identification scheme. Assuming that the logs of output {yt} and the price level {pt} have 
unit root but their first difference is stationary, we can represent the vector of the first differences, 
of these two variables, Xt, as an infinite moving-average representation:  
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where L is the lag operator, Ai are 2x2 matrices representing the impulse response functions of 
the shocks to the elements of Xt, and dtε  and stε are independent white noise demand and supply 
shocks. 
 To enable us to identify the shocks, we assume, based on the AD-AS model, that demand 
shocks have no permanent effect on output while supply shocks do have. Thus, the cumulative 
effect of demand shocks on ty∆  is zero:  
0
0
11 =∑
∞
=i
ia                              (2) 
The model can be estimated using the following finite reduced form VAR: 
tktpttt eXBXBXBX ++++= −−− ...2211                        (3) 
which takes the following infinite moving average representation: 
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where the B's represent the estimated coefficients of regressing ty∆  and tp∆  on lagged values of 
both ty∆  and tp∆ , and k is the optimal lag length that ensures white noise residuals, et. Writing 
the relation between the reduced form disturbances, et, and the structural shocks, εt, as 
tt Ce ε=                    (5) 
four restrictions on the system are needed to identify the four elements of matrix C. The first two 
restrictions are normalization of the variances of dtε  and stε to unity, the third is the orthogonality 
condition 0),( =stdtE εε , and the fourth is the restriction imposed in equation (2). Substituting 
equation (5) into equation (4), the restriction imposed in equation (2) takes the following form: 
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The four restrictions allow us to uniquely identify the matrix C, and recover the demand and 
supply shocks from the estimated reduced-form disturbances, and the structural impulse 
responses. Once the series of shocks are calculated for all the countries in our sample, we 
compute the correlation coefficients between the shocks to assess how synchronized they are. 
3.2 Common Trends and Common Cycles  
To assess whether the GCC countries share synchronous long-run movements in their 
economic activity, which would imply the feasibility of forming a monetary union we test for 
cointegration among all possible pairs of GCC countries using the Johansen (1988) maximum 
likelihood method. 
Let us consider the following VAR model of order k:  
tktktt XAXAX εµ ++++= −−− 111 ....                                                                (7) 
where X is a vector of n endogenous variables. If all the variables are I(1) in their levels, we say 
that these variables are cointegrated if a non-trivial stationary linear combination of these 
variables exists. For n endogenous variable there can be at most n-1 distinct cointegration 
vectors.  In case that these variables are cointegrated, then by the Granger representation theorem, 
the VAR model can be expressed as the following VECM: 
ttktktt XXXX εµ +Π+∆Γ++Γ+=∆ −+−−− 11111 ....                   (8) 
where tε is a vector of white noise residuals. If the matrixΠ  is of rank 11 −<≤ nr , then it can be 
decomposed into 'βα=Π , where )(rxnα and )(rxnβ , and equation (8) can be reformulated as: 
ttktktt XXXX εβαµ ++∆Γ++∆Γ+=∆ −+−−− )'(.... 11111               (9) 
where the rows of β are interpreted as distinct cointegration vectors, and the α’s are the 
adjustment coefficients to long-run equilibrium. Johansen's (1988) cointegration technique allows 
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us to test and determine the number of cointegrating relationships (the rank of matrix Π) between 
the nonstationary variables in the system using the maximum likelihood procedure.  
The existence of cointegration implies that countries share synchronous long-run 
movements in their economic activity, which indicates a higher likelihood for forming a 
monetary union. Nonetheless, even if a long-run relationship exists, short run business cycles in 
GDP might be asynchronous and require country specific monetary policies. In this case, the 
feasibility of forming a monetary union could be low.  
To test for common cycles in the presence of common trends, we use the procedure 
developed by Vahid and Engle (1993). This procedure amounts to finding the sample canonical 
correlations between ∆Xt and ( )121 ,,...,,)( −−−− ∆∆∆∆≡ tkttt ZXXXkW , where k is the lag order of the 
system in differences (one less than the lag order of the VAR in levels) and Zt-1 is the error 
correction term. Specifically, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the number of common 
cycle vectors is at least s is: 
( ) ( )∑
=
−−−−=
s
i
ikTskC
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21log1),( λ                          (10) 
where the 2iλ 's are the s smallest squared canonical correlations between ∆Xt and W(k). Under the 
null hypothesis, the statistic C(k,s) has a χ2 distribution with s(s + nk + r – n) degrees of freedom, 
where n is the dimension of the system and r is the number of cointegration vectors. 
3.3 Data 
Data on output and prices for member states of the GCC were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators website (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), International 
Financial Statistics 2003 CD ROM as well as from the websites of the statistical bureaus and 
central banks of GCC countries. Output refers to real GDP in local currencies, while the price 
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level is the GDP deflator. All samples terminate in 2003, but start in different years as follows; 
Bahrain – 1975, Kuwait – 1962, Oman – 1963, Qatar – 1970, Saudi Arabia – 1968, and United 
Arab Emirates – 1973. 
4. Empirical Results 
Some indications of synchronization or rather a lack of it can be drawn from looking at 
the raw data of real GDP growth and inflation. Table 1 displays the means and standard 
deviations for these measures from which it is clear that the long run growth rates vary greatly. 
While Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia experienced modest annual growth rates ranging from a 
mere 0.65% (Kuwait) to 2.63% (Qatar), the rest of the countries displayed impressive 
performances. Furthermore, some of the economies (Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE) are characterized 
by especially volatile economic activity compared with the rest. From inflation figures we get a 
different picture. All GCC members have relatively low rates of inflation, though of a volatile 
nature. Additional supporting evidence is depicted in Table 2 which presents the correlations of 
real GDP growth and inflation. While the GCC countries do not exhibit significant correlations of 
GDP growth except for between Qatar and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and UAE, inflation rates are 
highly correlated in all other cases. Hence, we gather that inflation rates exhibit a great deal of 
convergence whereas economic activity does not. Now that we have some idea of the nature of 
the relationships among the GCC economies we can conduct a rigorous formal assessment of 
these relationships based on recovering the correlations of the demand and supply shocks and on 
examining the existence of common trends and business cycles.  
4.1 Correlation of Shocks 
 Before recovering the exogenous demand and supply shocks in the VAR system of output 
and prices, we examine the time series properties of our two variables, the natural logarithm of 
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real GDP (y) and the natural logarithm of the GDP deflator (p). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests presented in Table 3 reveal that the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance levels for both y and p for all countries. When taking the 
first differences of the variables, our tests show that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
in all cases. Thus, we conclude that y and p are integrated of first order, I(1). The Lagrange 
multiplier test for up to fourth order serial correlation in the residuals does not indicate the 
presence of serial correlation. 
 Next, the underlying demand and supply shocks are recovered. Panel (a) of Figures 3 and 
4 depict the impulse responses of the price level to demand and supply shocks, their magnitude 
and the speed of adjustments to such shocks. The higher the magnitudes of the shocks and the 
slower the adjustment, the higher are the costs of maintaining a currency union. We see that the 
implicit over-identifying restriction that positive demand shocks lead to permanently higher 
prices is fulfilled in all cases (Figure 3). However, the second over-identifying restriction, that 
positive supply shocks lead to permanently lower prices is not satisfied in all cases with the 
exception of Kuwait (Figure 4). The rise in prices following a supply shock is negligible in four 
cases and substantial only in the case of Saudi Arabia. This anomaly has also been reported by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) for three North American regions that are heavy producers of 
raw materials (Western Canada, North West U.S. and South West U.S.). These American regions 
are similar in their economic structure to the GCC economies in that they also rely heavily on 
production of oil and natural gas. Due to the economic structure of the GCC countries, a positive 
supply shock could be accompanied by a positive demand shock that offsets the impact of the 
supply shock and consequently leads to higher prices. 
It is worth noting that convergence of the price level following demand and supply shocks 
are very fast, especially after demand shocks. On the other hand, the magnitude of the response of 
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the price level to shocks varies greatly across the GCC countries. This observation is clearly 
evident in relation to demand shocks—while UAE and Bahrain's price responses to demand 
shocks are modest, the responses of the price level are relatively large in the rest of the countries. 
The impact of demand and supply shocks on output is presented in panel (b) of Figures 3 
and 4, respectively. Our restriction that demand shocks have no permanent effect on output is 
fulfilled in all cases (Figure 3). As the AD-AS framework suggests, following a demand shock, 
the output of all countries rises temporarily but the effect wanes relatively quickly. On the other 
hand, a positive supply shock leads to higher output, however, with varied degrees (Figure 4). 
Our next step is to calculate the correlation coefficients between the identified demand 
and supply disturbances among the GCC countries. The more symmetric the shocks (positive 
correlations), the more feasible for group pf countries to form a currency union. Supply shocks 
are likely to reflect exogenous factors such as oil price shocks while demand shocks reflect both 
exogenous factors and macroeconomic policies. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) argue that 
supply shocks serve as better indicators of the symmetry or asymmetry of the underlying 
disturbances following a change in the exchange rate regime. The pairwise and common sample 
correlation coefficients are reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
From Table 4 we can see that, generally speaking, the contemporaneous supply shocks are 
asymmetric. Among the fifteen pairs of countries the correlation coefficients are either negative 
or positive but statistically insignificant in all instances. In fact, the supply shocks of Kuwait and 
Qatar are negative and significant (-0.42 and -0.46 using pairwise and common samples, 
respectively). Correlations of supply shocks of the leading GCC country, Saudi Arabia, with 
those of the other countries are mostly positive correlations though statistically insignificant. 
These asymmetric supply disturbances do not lend support to the establishment of a viable 
currency union among the GCC countries. Still such low and negative correlations have been 
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documented among the industrial European Union countries and Southern European members 
where currency union is considered to be quite viable. (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 2003 and 
Buigut and Valev, 2005).  
When we turn to the demand shocks (Table 5) we find that, in contrast to supply shocks, 
the correlation coefficients among the paired countries are positive and highly significant in most 
cases except for UAE with Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. This finding indicates that 
contemporaneous demand shocks faced by the GCC countries, unlike supply shocks, are 
generally symmetric. The correlations are generally higher and more significant than those 
reported for EU and NAFTA regions by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). This finding can be 
explained by the fact that GCC economies are dominated by public sector that boosts demand 
during episodes of high oil prices and reduces demand during episodes of low oil prices. 
Our tests were conducted also with the inclusion of dummy variables in the VAR system 
for some major exogenous events that affected the region, particularly the oil crises of 1973, 1979 
and the Gulf War in 1991. However, we did not observe significant changes in our results. 
The above findings show that while supply shocks are asymmetric, demand shocks are 
symmetric. Since supply shocks are more crucial in gauging the costs of forming a monetary 
union we can conclude that the GCC countries are not ready to establish a currency union that 
would prove viable. To further reinforce our findings, we examine whether GCC countries share 
synchronous long-run and short-run economic activity. 
4.2 Common Trends and Common Features 
To test whether GCC members share a common long-run trend in their output, we 
conducted cointegration tests for fifteen possible pairs of countries. The unit root tests show that 
the real output is integrated of order one in its level, but stationary in its first difference for all 
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countries (Table 3). The results of the cointegration tests are presented in Table 6. Among the 
fifteen combinations of countries we find that a long-run common trend exists in four cases 
regardless of the rank determination test. The signs in the cointegration vector (β in Table 6) are 
positive as expected. Additionally, the error correction coefficients (the α's in Table 6) are 
significant at least in one of the two equations for every pair of countries for which we detected 
cointegration. This implies that divergence from a long-run equilibrium is short-lived and real 
GDP adjusts to the long-run common trend. 
Overall, since only a few long-run relationships were detected among the possible pairs of 
economies we may infer that the economic activity of the GCC countries in most cases is not 
linked and more efforts are needed to increase the degree of compatibility among these countries. 
The only supporting factor for forming a GCC currency union is that three GCC countries share a 
long-run trend with Saudi Arabia, which is the largest and most dominant economy in the region. 
 As mentioned earlier, the existence of a long-run trend is necessary but insufficient when 
assessing the degree of synchronization of economic activity. Short-run business cycles, if 
idiosyncratic, may require country-specific policies that are infeasible under the regime of 
currency union. To account for business cycles synchronization we applied the Vahid and Engle 
(1993) procedure to test for common serial correlation of business cycles for the four pairs of 
countries in which cointegration was detected. The results reported in Table 7 demonstrate that 
the null hypothesis of at least one common cycle vector is not rejected in three cases, while the 
null hypothesis of at least two common cycle vectors is rejected in all cases. Thus, we may 
conclude that in three out of the four cases the pairs of countries share common business cycles 
and react symmetrically to shocks. Since a necessary requirement for viable currency union is 
 17
sharing common long-run trend and short-run cycles, our findings again lend no support for a 
establishing a currency union among the GCC members.      
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 We examine whether the six members of the GCC are ready to form a viable currency 
union applying three different methods. First, the Structural VAR procedure of Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) for identification of demand and supply disturbances. Imposing the restriction of the 
demand shocks having no permanent impact on output enables us to identify both demand and 
supply shocks. The presence of significant positive shocks correlations among the prospective 
economies may indicate a low cost for forming a currency union. We find that while supply 
shocks are asymmetric (no significant positive correlations), demand shocks are symmetric. Since 
supply shocks are the product of external factors and not domestic policies, they constitute better 
indicators of the costs of forming a monetary union. Thus, lack of significant correlations lends 
no support for the readiness of the GCC countries to establish a viable currency union. 
Second, we test for the existence of long-run relationships of real GDP among all the 
possible pairs of countries by conducting the Johansen cointegration tests. Sharing a common 
trend signifies lower costs of establishing a currency union. Among the fifteen possible pairs of 
countries we find that only four pairs are cointegrated while the rest are not. Hence,  it seems that 
the economic activities of the GCC members are not linked and more is to be done to enhance 
their compatibility. 
Third, since sharing a long-run common trend does not necessarily imply a short-run 
synchronization we conduct the Vahid and Engle ( 1993) test for common serial correlation of the 
business cycles for the four pairs of countries for which cointegration was detected. Common 
business cycles are found in three cases. Since sharing common long-run trends and short-run 
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business cycles is vital for a feasible currency union we conclude on the grounds of our findings 
that the requirements for a successful union are not yet met. 
Inline with most of the previous studies, the three methods employed here provide no 
evidence of the readiness of the GCC members to establish a lasting and well functioning 
currency union. Despite the remarkable progress that has been made in aligning monetary 
policies and adopting the European convergence criteria, significant efforts are needed to align 
the fiscal, financial, and political systems. Undoubtedly, the firm commitment of the leaders of 
the GCC countries to further enhance economic integration among member states is considered 
one of the key factors that would boost the likelihood of success of the currency union. 
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Table 1 – Real GDP Growth and Inflation – Means and Standard Deviations 
 Common Sample Individual Samples 
 Growth Inflation Growth Inflation 
 Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Bahrain  5.17 3.85 1.52 7.41 5.17 3.85 1.52 7.41 
Kuwait  0.65 20.76 3.26 14.08 1.36 17.18 5.54 18.85 
Oman  6.78 5.51 1.53 12.89 9.63 13.22 4.78 19.35 
Qatar  2.63 8.81 3.97 16.34 3.66 8.29 6.57 15.76 
S. Arabia 2.40 4.71 2.63 11.20 4.80 7.13 6.62 16.88 
UAE 4.18 9.51 2.48 4.98 4.53 9.52 2.81 5.19 
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Table 2 – Correlations of Real GDP Growth and Inflation 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar S. Arabia UAE 
Bahrain   -0.092 0.129 -0.108 0.146 0.046 
Kuwait  0.673*  -0.078 0.395* -0.231 -0.103 
Oman  0.550* 0.844*  -0.256 -0.090 -0.117 
Qatar  0.789* 0.772* 0.763*  0.078 -0.002 
S. Arabia 0.680* 0.839* 0.803* 0.771*  0.445* 
UAE 0.553* 0.682* 0.647* 0.691* 0.569*  
 
     
 
Correlation coefficients for real GDP growth are on the upper triangle and inflation correlation 
coefficients are on the lower triangle. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3 – ADF Unit Root Test Results (with intercept and trend) 
 Levels First Difference 
 ADF p LM(4) ADF p LM(4) 
Real GDP 
 
Bahrain  -3.22 1 0.12 -5.40*** 1 1.00 
Kuwait  -2.75 0 6.10 -4.61*** 3 1.47 
Oman  -2.37 1 7.02 -3.64*** 0 3.81 
Qatar  -0.95 0 4.69 -5.13*** 0 1.98 
S. Arabia -3.32 0 2.30 -3.08** 0 3.87 
UAE -2.38 1 3.09 -3.92*** 0 1.64 
 
GDP Deflator 
Bahrain  -2.94 1 3.61 -4.07*** 0 3.48 
Kuwait  -1.15 0 2.73 -5.70*** 4 2.58 
Oman  -1.19 0 3.89 -4.99*** 0 4.08 
Qatar  -2.39 0 1.72 -4.58*** 0 1.16 
S. Arabia -1.80 0 6.96 -3.53** 0 0.44 
UAE -3.02 0 2.67 -5.64*** 0 3.24 
 
Notes: 
p is the optimal lag chosen by the SIC. Maximum lag allowed is 4. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to fourth-order serial correlation in 
the residuals, which is asymptotically distributed 24χ . 
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Table 4 – Correlation Matrix of Supply Shocks§ 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar S. Arabia UAE 
Bahrain   0.291 0.076 0.008 0.049 -0.107 
Kuwait  0.291  0.051 -0.419* -0.040 0.095 
Oman  0.076 -0.046  -0.107 -0.102 -0.113 
Qatar  0.008 -0.457* -0.123  0.102 0.004 
S. Arabia 0.049 0.131 -0.041 0.039  0.057 
UAE -0.107 0.085 -0.218 0.061 0.081  
 
     
 
§
 Pairwise correlations are on the upper triangle and common sample correlations are on the lower 
triangle. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 – Correlation Matrix of Demand Shocks§ 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar S. Arabia UAE 
Bahrain   0.569* 0.621* 0.815* 0.658* 0.415* 
Kuwait  0.569*  0.758* 0.456* 0.374* 0.280 
Oman  0.621* 0.755*  0.514* 0.680* 0.276 
Qatar  0.815* 0.595* 0.704*  0.533* 0.406* 
S. Arabia 0.658* 0.697* 0.775* 0.794*  0.234 
UAE 0.415* 0.281 0.306* 0.406* 0.262  
 
     
 
§
 Pairwise correlations are on the upper triangle and common sample correlations are on the lower 
triangle. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 – Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Country Pairs p Trace λmax β αi/αj 
Bahrain-Kuwait 3 7.83 7.83   
Bahrain-Oman 2 7.23 6.47   
Bahrain-Qatar 1 8.57 8.56   
Bahrain-S. Arabia 4 19.44** 19.44** 2.26*** 0.04/0.32*** 
Bahrain-UAE 4 12.39 11.9   
Kuwait-Oman 1 14.38 8.66   
Kuwait-Qatar 2 25.84*** 25.71*** 0.25* -0.58***/0.12 
Kuwait-S. Arabia 3 17.71** 14.90** 1.50*** -0.07/0.89*** 
Kuwait-UAE 2 10.66 9.62   
Oman-Qatar 1 5.57 5.5   
Oman-S. Arabia 3 24.03*** 17.99** 1.90*** -0.19***/0.12 
Oman-UAE 2 12.13 9.39   
Qatar –S. Arabia 2 7.62 7.51   
Qatar-UAE 1 11 10.66   
S. Arabia-UAE 1 14.09 11.3   
 
 
    
Notes: 
The hypotheses for the trace tests are: H0: r=0 H1: r>0 while for the maximal eigenvalue test the hypotheses 
are:  H0: r=0 H1: r=1, where r denotes the number of cointegration vectors. 
p is the optimal lag chosen by the SIC. Maximum lag allowed is 4.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7 – Test Results for Common Feature 
Country pair S Degrees of 
Freedom 
Canonical  
statistic λ  
Common Feature  
statistic C(p,s) 
Critical values  
(5%) 
1 6 0.64 9.48 12.59 Bahrain-S. Arabia 
2 14 0.79 27.29*** 23.68 
1 2 0.19 0.97 5.99 Kuwait-Qatar 
2 6 0.75 23.85*** 12.59 
1 4 0.37 4.23 9.49 Kuwait-S. Arabia 
2 10 0.75 27.70*** 18.31 
1 4 0.51 8.37* 9.49 Oman-S. Arabia 2 10 0.80 37.52*** 18.31 
Notes: 
S denotes the number of common features. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Figure 1 – A positive demand shock in the AD-AS model  
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Figure 2 – A positive supply shock in the AD-AS model  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
P 
AD SRAS 
LRAS 
P0 
Y0 
 E0
LRAS1 
SRAS1 
  
Y2 Y1  
P1 
P2 
SRAS2 
E1
E2
 
 30
Figure 3 –Price Level and Real GDP Cumulative Response to Demand Shocks 
(a) Price Level 
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Figure 4 – Real GDP and Price Level Cumulative Response to Supply Shocks 
(a) Price Level 
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Years
BAH KUW OMAN QAT SAU UAE
 
(b) Real GDP 
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